In this paper we present a model of tax compliance with heterogeneous agents who maximize their individual utility based on income and the conjectured level of per capita public expenditure. We formally include psychological drivers in this model. These drivers affect individual behavior, such as risk aversion, together with appreciation of public expenditure, expectations about peers' compliance and a natural inclination to comply, all of which we summarize in a quality termed "citizenship". The enforcement system, based on random inspections, is standard and only partially known to agents. The agent-based model is simulated under a variety of settings, representing different "societies". We use the artificial data produced by the model to estimate the effects of taxpayers' traits on personal tax behavior and to build a compliance societal slippery slope. At the individual level, we find a positive dependence of compliance on all variables, with the significant exception of the tax rate, which has a negative impact. As far as societies are concerned, we show how aggregate tax compliance depends on composite indices of citizenship and power, and we find that the former is more important than the latter.
1.

Introduction
The problem of tax compliance has always been central to the theory of public finance, and its relevance has increased over time. The seminal models by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) assume a neat rational framework where individual decisions are taken based on a cost-benefit analysis under uncertainty driven by the probability of auditing and the effects of fines. An impressive body of research has built on this approach to overcome limitations, and now incorporates other determinants of behavior and provides more realistic descriptions of observed data. A particularly important issue is excessive tax compliance observed in the real world with respect to the level that the standard model of tax evasion would predict 1 . Another significant issue is the impact of the level of tax rates on compliance which, in Allingham, Sandmo and Yitzhaki"s works, is ambiguous or opposite to what is currently supported by common sense 2 or experimental findings. It was influentially pointed out that all tax-related decisions are not purely individual affairs, but depend on the quantity, efficiency and fairness of public expenditure, which should ultimately be financed by tax revenues: with no hope of being exhaustive, see Cowell and Gordon (1988) , Cowell (1992) , Bordignon (1993) and Rablen (2010) for up-to-date descriptions. Pyle (1991) , Andreoni et al. (1998) and, more recently, Sandmo (2005) provide well-written summaries of further developments and research themes. After seminal contributions by Schmölders in the 1960"s, see Frank and Kirchler (2006) , recognition that psychological factors may be relevant for understanding and modeling tax behavior has gained tremendous momentum in the past decade, see Kirchler (2007) . Compliance, the result of complex interactions between taxpayers and their respective Government, is situated on a slippery slope, where both trust in authorities and power shape the behavior of a collectivity of agents. Tax morale, see Alm and Torgler (2006) , Torgler (2007) , and knowledge/perception of the enforcement system are intuitively useful to explain how taxpayers behave; their importance is empirically and experimentally grounded. In our opinion, fewer works have explored how such elements can be introduced to formal models of individual responses. One exception is the rich strand of agent-based models that offer useful insights through numerical simulations of the complex behavior of heterogeneous agents. The seminal contribution in this field can be traced back to Mittone and Patelli (2000) , who state that tax evasion can spread among agents like 1 See Bernasconi (1998) . 2 See Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004) .
2 outbreaks. Different types of agents can copy other agents" actions, if this is myopically deemed more convenient and, as a result, in the absence of a sufficient number of audits, evaders multiply at the expense of more honest taxpayers. Since then, other authors have taken similar approaches. For example, a set of distinct types is exogenously assumed to exist, see for instance Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010) , who also have agents making random errors in their reported income, and Antunes et al. (2007) who consider different bounded rational agents. Davis et al. (2003) analyze a model with honest and susceptible agents together with evaders and show that if an initially compliant population shifts to evasion, it is difficult to reverse the situation and the number of audits must be increased beyond the level that would have achieved acceptable compliance in the first place.
Agent-based models are able to explore several issues that are difficult to tackle using analytical models. Repeated interaction among heterogeneous agents or between the fiscal administration and the taxpayers can typically be simulated. The model presented in Korobow et al. (2007) is an attempt to consider geographical spillovers and "contagion" effects, as agents are networked in localized structures and are aware of their neighbours" actions, facing peer pressure and conformity pressure. It is shown in the paper that substantial sharing of payoff information and tax practices can lead to less compliant behavior. While it is not entirely surprising that one bad apple can spoil the whole basket, the result also illustrates that a certain degree of taxpayers" "impressionability" may be conducive to a relatively high degree of compliance, even in the event of modest levels of auditing.
Despite the risk of increasing the number of parameters, the flexibility of agent-based methodology facilitates great sophistication in the depiction of many realistic features of taxpayers and of the data available to the fiscal authority. Bloomquist (2006) provides a good introduction to the field. He describes the Tax Compliance Simulator where audit efficacy and celerity, together with a host of other parameters, can be changed to test overall compliance and the success of specific auditing schemes with regard to both direct and indirect effects (due to additional revenues from fines and greater compliance of other "forewarned" taxpayers, respectively). Bloomquist (2011) builds on some of the previous ideas to present a situated agent-based model with 85,000 agents who are calibrated using realistic anonymized public data from the US Internal Revenue Service.
At the other extreme, a number of recent papers in the econophysics literature simplify relationships bewteen agents and present terse models of interaction based essentially on the Ising model of ferromagnetism. In Zaklan et al. (2009) , 1,000,000 agents with "spin" are in contact on a grid; they are subject to local interactions and, possibly, social forces (due to 3 mass media or cultural biases, say). As is typical of similar models, there are critical thresholds of the model"s parameters that trigger phase changes. In Pickhardt and Seibold"s (2011) recent paper, it is shown that Ising-like models can to some extent reproduce situations in which different types of taxpayer are present.
This paper presents a model with heterogeneous agents who maximize their individual utility based on (after-tax) income and the conjectured level of per capita public expenditure. Agents have different levels of risk aversion, a distinct relative preference for public expenditure, varying confidence in the likelihood that others will pay the amounts due and an innate attitude to comply, which can be associated with cultural traits, social constraints or shame.
Hence, their final decisions rest on micro-founded rational behavior, personal characteristics and subjective judgements. The enforcement system, based on random inspections, is only partially known to agents. These agents establish noisy estimates of the auditing probability by meeting other taxpayers and exchanging information about income. In each period, an individual can optimally conceal a certain amount of income based on conjectures about the perceived probability of being audited, the perceived level of public expenditure and the perceived amount of tax paid by other individuals.
We contribute to the literature in two main ways. Firstly, we formally include psychological drivers in the model that affect individual behavior. Some parameters, broadly related to "trust" and tax morale, capture the appreciation of public expenditure and the natural inclination to comply. The combination of the previous ingredients with the expectation that peers will reciprocate appears to be related to "good citizenship", a quality that helps agents to fulfill their civic duties. Hence, our work suggests ways to link conceptual dimensions to specific personal parameters 3 and shows how to combine them to make a citizenship index.
Secondly, we use simulated data drawn from a variety of "societies" to estimate a compliance slippery slope and then discuss how individual micro-motives aggregate in a variety of social macro-behaviors. Such a link is commonly drawn in agent-based approaches but, as far as we know, this is the first time a full-fledged slippery slope has been analyzed. On a more methodological note, the model generates artificial data that is then used to build a surface that correlates well to some stylized facts, even though this is not yet meant to describe any specific situation.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the agents" behavior leaving some technical details for Section 3, which is devoted to presenting our simulations and the parameters used. We stress that data can be examined at both the personal and the aggregate level; results are discussed in Sections 4 and 5 bearing in mind this duality. Section 6 offers a summary and a number of final remarks.
The model
We consider two types of agents, namely individuals and the Government. Individuals maximize their utility under a fixed monetary income. The utility function depends on aftertax income and the perceived level of public expenditure, together with individual attitudes to comply, which can be thought of as tax morale. Agents choose the fraction of income to be declared in order to pay income tax. Hence, based on heterogeneous parameters, they have the option to underreport their income to illegally reduce their tax burden.
The Government determines the income tax rate, collects all tax payments and uses the entire revenue to fund public expenditure, ensuring its budget is always balanced.
The Government can also counter tax evasion by controlling a fraction of individuals and by fining tax evaders.
Agents face the standard problem of deciding how much of their income they wish to declare for income taxation. Each individual i=1, …, N has a cardinal utility function:
where y i is the net (after-tax) monetary income, G i is the perceived value of public expenditure, and
comprises individual characteristics. We anticipate that i  allows agents to differ in their risk aversion, relative preference for public expenditure, innate attitude to comply and expectations about other agents" behaviors (conformity).
We suppose the utility function satisfies the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: positive marginal utility of income and public expenditure:
Assumption 2: concavity of utility function:
Assumption 3: minimum level of utility reached when either 0
The main idea behind our assumptions is that both private income and public expenditure are required in a society to provide material and immaterial satisfaction to agents.
One specification that satisfies all the previous assumptions is:
. In particular, we assume that: To evaluate their utility i U , agents require a certain amount of knowledge of the term in square brackets, which in turn requires the likelihood and effects of audits to be taken into account and an estimate of public expenditure. Income tax is charged at a constant rate t on the exogenous amount of income I i , which is known to the taxpayer only. Hence, the amount of tax paid by individual i is:
With this Cobb-Douglas-type utility function, concavity requires 
Given the control activity of the Government, each individual faces a probability q of being controlled. If individuals are audited, their tax evasion will definitely be discovered and a fine of f times the amount of evaded tax will be payable:
In the simulations of the model presented in Section 3, individuals do not exactly know the probability of control q, but estimate their own subjective i p at any time following random interaction with other agents.
If the taxpayer is not controlled, her net income is
If, instead, the taxpayer is audited, her net income is:
Each individual knows that, in aggregate, the Government budget constraint holds, hence public expenditure is equal to the total tax revenue 5 :
However, no agents have full information on the current G and a conjecture must be used to obtain a reasonable tentative estimate. Not surprisingly, it turns out that the way in which G is estimated has a considerable impact on decisions. Per capita public expenditure 6 can be split into two parts: the part paid by individual i and the part paid by all others, so that:
If we define the per capita public expenditure financed by all other individuals as:
and, in a society with a large number of agents, we approximate 1/N to 0 and (N-1)/N to 1, we get:
It is worthwhile noting that the constant factor N does not affect the optimal choice and, without loss of generality, we consider in the following the simplified utility function:
When choosing the rate of compliance, each taxpayer has to estimate how other individuals react to variations in her contribution 7 . As i g is not known, the i-th agent must form her own expectation i g about other people"s average contribution. This is modeled as an individual adjustment of the level of the previous period per capita public expenditure, 1  g , which we assume to be publicly observed with a conjecture about other people"s reaction to their variation of the rate of compliance, so that:
Ĩ is the agent"s estimate of the average income,
) is a "conformity" 8 parameter, as in Cowell-Gordon (1988) , and 1  g is the observed level of per capita public expenditure in the previous period.
If i g approaches 1, the agent believes that others will react in the same direction (positive conjectural variation). In other words, if the agent increases her compliance rate, she believes that all other individuals will behave in the same way. If, on the contrary, i g is close to 0, the 7 See Cornes and Sandler (1986) , page 151: "The Nash assumption is that each individual expects no response by the rest of the community to variation in his or her own contribution. However, unless the reaction curve of the rest of the community is in fact horizontal, reflecting an actual response of zero, such a conjecture is not consonant with observable facts." 8 This definition of conformity differs from "group conformity", defined in Gordon (1989) and Myles and Naylor (1996) , in which it is assumed that individuals are more likely to evade the more others evade. 8 individual believes that other agents will not change their behavior (zero conjectural variation) 9 and therefore assumes that the per capita public expenditure will remain constant.
We expect that the higher the compliance rate, the higher the conformity parameter i g will be.
With respect to Kirchler et al. (2008) , we note that conformity is a form of "trust" that has to do with other citizens and not with the central government, being related to the perceptions of how other taxpayers behave in a given institutional and social framework.
We finally introduce citizens" attitudes towards paying taxes to the utility function, assuming that scale factor i A depends on an individual parameter 0  i k :
[17]
For a given level of compliance, factor
leads to higher increases in utility the higher i k is. At the same time, a decrement in the compliance rate produces a larger decline in utility for individuals with higher i k . Hence, this parameter can be thought of as a measure of the agent"s tax morale or, alternatively, of the "shame" arising due to tax evasion.
The above definitions lead to the following full specification:
. A higher level of compliance then has multiple effects on the level of utility: it decreases utility due to a lower net income but simultaneously increases it via the expected per capita public expenditure and through the tax morale multiplicative factor.
Each taxpayer chooses which share of income to declare, d i , in order to maximize the expected utility:
We assume that updates of both p i and i g depend on random meetings with other agents, from which the required sample information about the actual auditing frequency and income is obtained. A more formal description is given in the next section.
9 See Cornes and Sandler (1986) 9
Compliance in a variety of societies with heterogeneous agents
This section is devoted to describing how the previous model can be simulated in an agentbased framework with many heterogeneous agents. To the best of our knowledge, in fact, it is impossible to derive clear implications from the standard comparative statics exercise based on first-order conditions. Also, in particular, it is extremely difficult to characterize the aggregate behavior of a society of diverse taxpayers with respect to several parameters.
Hence, numerical simulation appears to be the methodological tool that can shed light on the main features of this model more effectively.
We assume that agents are able to decide which best action is best for them in terms of the compliance rate and, indeed, that they can optimize their utility given their personal traits.
However, their rationality is bounded as they do not exactly know the probability of being audited and the amount of tax actually paid by other agents.
Each agent gathers the necessary information by meeting  n other individuals in each period.
Encounters are random and independent across agents and along time, i.e., each taxpayer will meet the same number of newly sampled agents at each time. Although this matching mechanism may be oversimplified, it retains the ability to describe settings in which agents have volatile estimates of some important variables. From each of her  n meetings, the agent learns:
 whether the other taxpayer has been controlled; and  the other agent"s level of income.
Agents do not exchange any information about the amount of tax due or the degree of compliance, which seem to be more sensitive pieces of information. As a whole, these pairings allow the agent to compute a noisy estimate  p i of the true audit probability  q and of the population"s average income. In realistic situations, we expect the number of meetings  n to be much smaller than the number of agents  N . Letting c i n (out of  n) be the number of encountered agents who have been controlled, the subjective audit probability for agent  i at time  t is  n i c /n . As the Government can change its audit policy at any time, the agent reestimates the subjective probability in each period, and we assume that the value  ). Therefore, the i-th agent"s subjective probability of being controlled is:
The very same mechanism is used to estimate the average income, and we assume that the sample average income i Ĩ observed in the meetings is:
is the set of agents that i meets at time t (which is omitted for notational simplicity).
The Government is in charge of:
 selecting the tax policy by choosing the level of income tax rate  ;
 providing public goods and services to be financed by tax revenues; and  adopting an adequate auditing policy comprising the choice of the fraction q of individuals to control and the rate of penalties  f .
With respect to the evasion control policy, we simply assume a purely random auditing scheme, so that a share q of all agents is randomly controlled in each period. Furthermore, we assume that the Government chooses its fine rate by comparing the punishment for tax evasion to those for other offenses, so that both  agents inherit previous period"s parameters, maximize utility to decide their tax compliance, and pay taxes;  the Government funds public expenditure, performs the random control of taxpayers, and punishes tax evaders; and  agents gather information while meeting other taxpayers and revise their estimates of the probability of being controlled and of the average income of the population.
To this end, we simulate a framework in which agents interact and the levels of public expenditure and compliance are stochastic, eventually stabilizing around values driven by the distribution of the personal features of taxpayers and by the Government"s enforcement policy (in addition to a handful of other "technical" parameters, such as  n and   ).
In each simulation we sample agents from distributions characterized by different individual parameters in order to represent different "societies" with specific institutional settings.
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In other words, we can interpret a society as a specific set of values for some key parameters that shape the inhabitants" features and the institutional aspects of the tax collection system. Clearly, different societies are likely to exhibit sundry behaviors with respect to aggregate tax compliance and public expenditure, and one of the aims of this work is to clarify which societal dimensions are the most relevant for developing an illuminating description of potentially dissimilar tax-related conducts. Our model allows for diversity both across and within societies and it is likely, say, that some free riders coexist with a population of taxpayers that, as a whole, is very compliant. Obviously, our approach does not allow us to justify why parameters have specific values or how they evolved to reach those values and, in this sense, we still have a "black box" issue to address. To partially overcome this problem, we study a variety of outcomes and explore possible causal effects by sampling many static societies.
We run 250 simulations in which we pick random institutional parameters and minimum and maximum values that characterize the distributions of individual parameters. To avoid transient effects and taking into account the fact that the system stabilizes in a few tens of periods, we run 200 rounds in each simulation and only keep the data obtained in the last simulation. Table 1 shows the values of parameters used in the simulations. Although agent-based models are attractive due to their ability to allow for interaction and the massive heterogeneity of agents, this typically results in a large number of parameters. This is sometimes referred to as "the wilderness of bounded rationality" 10 and is one on the main reasons why it is difficult to analytically solve agent-based models. One way to overcome the problem and to reduce the number of effective degrees of freedom is to focus on meta-parameters that describe the distribution from which individual traits are sampled. Equivalently, meta-parameters can be thought of as descriptions of the range of individual parameters, and each society is indeed fully described by some values for its meta-parameters. In the following, we will consistently use the word "parameter" when individual quantities, such as  In a related fashion, societies where low (high) auditing probabilities and penalty levels are in place are expected to display a tendency for lower (higher) compliance.
The results of our simulations are presented in the next sections. In particular, Section 4 focuses on individuals and provides a descriptive analysis of a cross-section of taxpayers" compliance, together with a regression analysis intended to show how parameters affect the actions of single agents. We also comment on three fictitious taxpayers with low, average and high "citizenship" to exemplify different (but somewhat typical) behaviors. Section 5 leaves aside individuals and focuses on the study of tax compliance in different societies. We identify and discuss the main drivers of aggregate behavior through regressions, and develop indices of power and citizenship in terms of the meta-parameters that are largely able to explain how societies position themselves on a slippery slope of tax compliance.
Individual compliance
This section discusses the individual data produced from our 250 simulations. Some descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2 , which shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for each parameter. As expected, the values in the "Min" and "Max" columns are close to the extremes of the sample ranges described by the metaparameters of Table 1 . Note that our taxpayers exhibit compliance that spans the whole [0-100%] interval 11 , with an average of 82.15%.
The distribution of individual compliance rates is depicted in Figure 1a , where it is apparent that a large fraction (54.6%) of agents are nearly fully compliant. However, many agents massively underreport their income, producing a remarkably left-tailed distribution. To understand the relative importance of individual parameters, we treat the results of the simulations as if they were individual observations of a cross-section of 250,000 agents.
Being the dependent variable d defined in the range [0,1], we use a tobit regression to tackle the large number of censored observations and to estimate linear and quadratic models where the compliance rate depends on the parameters listed in Table 3 . Other specifications were tested and led to inferior results. The censored models presented here appear to be adequate in terms of goodness of fit and have an approximately normal residuals distribution.
All other coefficients apart from income are extremely significant and there is a positive dependence of individual compliance on all individual characteristics and enforcement policy parameters. In agreement with intuition, instead, tax rate  has a negative impact on declared income. The quadratic model in Table 3 has a slightly better fit but, for the sake of exposition, we focus on the less complex linear model in the remaining part of the section. In a tobit regression, marginal effects are not simply the estimated coefficients; they must be computed, as they depend on the chosen values of dependent variables. In order to get an idea 17 of agents" behavior, we investigate three typical taxpayers called low, average and high citizenship agents. A low citizenship agent has parameters a , g and k in the lower range of possible values and, hence, has relatively low preference for public expenditure, and little conformity and attitude to comply. We expect a greater amount of underreporting from such a taxpayer, all other variables being equal. Similarly, we consider an average agent with parameters set at the average of the possible ranges, and a high citizenship individual with relatively large values for a , g and k , who is likely to be very compliant in a variety of situations.
To assess the effects in different institutional frameworks, it is convenient to evaluate the reactions of the typical previously defined agents when they are embedded in three societies distinguished by low, average and high enforcing power on the part of the Government.
Hence, we consider a low (respectively, average or high) perceived power society where the subjective auditing probability i p and penalty rate f are low (average or high). All in all, we consider 9 cases (3 types times 3 societies) in our analysis; Table 4 summarizes the relevant values of the parameters. As an example, the average taxpayer in an average power society, corresponding to the middle column of the second panel in Table 4 , believes there is a 5% audit probability per year and fines are equal to three times the tax evaded. The elasticities of compliance rate with respect to individual parameters, computed using estimated marginal effects, are reported in Table 5 . Take again the average agent in an average power society: compliance is about 90% and all parameters positively affect the contribution with the exception of tax rate
t. An increase of 1%, say, in the risk aversion 18 parameter  results in an additional compliance of 0.152% on average. The same increment in  (+1%) produces an almost two-fold effect on compliance (0.272%). Compliance of the average agent decreases by about 0.383% when the tax rate is increased by 1%. The strong negative sensitivity to hikes in t is a robust result of our simulations that correlates well with run-of-the-mill intuition. Table 5 shows that low citizenship individuals will massively underreport income when little power is exerted. Their compliance grows from 16.6% to 43.5% and 74.9% when the probability of audit and the penalty rates increase. Agents with average citizenship share this behavior to a different degree; they both need the presence of a certain degree of power to approach full compliance. Figure 2 represents the average compliance of our typical taxpayers under the three institutional arrangements. A kind of slippery slope can be discerned from it where both power and citizenship contribute at different degrees to obtaining high compliance. A more thorough investigation of this topic is deferred to the next section. Table 5 offers at least one additional insight related to the strength of different agents"
reactions. Indeed, the elasticities of low citizenship taxpayers are always larger than the average, which in turn are larger than those of high citizenship agents. At the two extremes, while the sensitivities of low citizenship individuals in a low power society are remarkably 19 pronounced, high citizenship makes agents virtually insensitive to changes in the parameters in any power situation (last columns of Table 5 ). 
Societal compliance
In this section we analyze how meta-parameters (i.e., features of society) affect average compliance. We will focus on the different outcomes that can be observed in various social contexts and support the finding that estimates based on simulated societies produce a slippery slope that depends jointly on measures of citizenship and power.
The estimates from the previous section implicitly describe individual decisions (based on personal conjectures) as if agents were unaware of the characteristics of the community to which they belong and, hence, the results do not enable us to assess the effects of a specific mix of features that distinguishes a given society. We are aware that there are obvious limitations in mapping societies to sets of values for the parameters, but the final picture is coherent and, as far as we know, this is the first case in which a full slippery slope has been estimated using simulated data arising from "artificial"
societies.
The average compliance obtained from each of our 250 simulated societies is regressed against the mean of the parameters" distributions, which can be derived from the metaparameters listed in Table 1 . Since the rate of compliance is now an average value for all individuals in each society, the dependent variable is no longer censored and lies inside the range [0,1]. However, a tobit regression is used again given the nature of the variable. Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients of the following model for average compliance: Note: * selected model that keeps coefficients with p-value<0.10, robust estimates The coefficients are strongly significant, they have the same sign as those shown in Table 3 , and the elasticities computed at the sample means, not reported here for brevity, have comparable magnitude. 1 , 0 by construction. This formalizes the intuition that citizenship is a mixture of individual parameters, whereas, in a similar way, power blends institutional policy variables.
It is also possible to express compliance from the estimate of the quadratic specification as 12 : [27] 2 2
Equations [24] and [27] are intuitive expressions that relate citizenship and power indices to aggregate compliance. This can be analyzed in different frameworks where attributes of citizenship and power change and all other relevant parameters are assumed to be fixed.
Based on the estimates of Table 6 , we obtain the values for
given in Table   7 , in which coefficients suggest that citizenship contributes to raising average compliance to a greater extent than power.
12 This holds under the assumption that In other words, in our model, which includes several more supplementary variables than in the classic setup where only risk aversion plays a role, voluntary compliance seems more relevant than enforced compliance in determining a society"s average rate of evasion. Note that our citizenship index encompasses more than trust in the Government"s ability to provide valuable public services in a fair manner (mainly captured by preference a for public expenditure vis-à-vis private income) as it depends also on the belief that other taxpayers will react in the same way (conformity g ), together with an innate attitude to comply (the role of k). While these components are not new and are often referred to in the literature in isolation, we feel that their joint presence, which we termed citizenship, is a novelty that captures compliance behavior better than trust in authority alone.
Our power index is more typical and is based on the two most natural attributes of enforcement, namely audit probability and penalty rate. the area of full compliance at the top of the surface is larger when the linear model is used 24 and, in particular, in the quadratic specification some evasion is present at the highest level of citizenship when power is low.
The surface is also shown for other tax rate levels, see panels c) and d). A higher (lower) tax rate leads to a lower (higher) constant A and, therefore, to less (more) average compliance. In the case of 50% tax rate, full compliance is never reached (at least for the ranges of the indices arising from reasonable values of the meta-parameters shown in Table 1 ).
We stress that the surface is the by-product of the estimate of statistical models from data gathered by simulating agent-based societies of heterogeneous utility maximizing taxpayers, whereas other researchers, Kirchler et al. (2008) , have discussed in depth the merits of the slippery slope as a conceptual model of tax behavior and have found some empirical support for its plausibility, Muehlbacher et al. (2011) . Similarly, our average compliance depends on 
Conclusion
We described an agent-based model of individual tax compliance, where heterogeneous agents maximize utility under risk, based on several individual features, such as their preference for public expenditure, their personal attitudes to comply, conformity and risk aversion. Decisions obviously depend not only on individual traits, but also on the perceived quality and quantity of per capita public expenditure and on the recognition that the bulk of revenues comes from other taxpayers. Simulations show a wide range of conducts, spanning from full honesty to massive underreporting, as expected from the agents" large degree of heterogeneity. As a whole, however, each society of taxpayers has an aggregate behavior shaped by meta-parameters that describe distributions of individual features. From our artificial cross-section data we estimate a model that shows how individual compliance 26 depends positively on citizenship-related attributes and on the strength of the enforcement system. By contrast, the tax rate negatively affects compliance, other things being fixed.
We then described and built indices of citizenship and power based on meta-parameters in several societies, and estimated a slippery slope fitting the artificial data we generated. This exercise produced a surface that is remarkably similar, but adds significant insight to previous works by other scholars, stressing the role of habits and beliefs that contributes to the success of a civil community.
Estimates show that, in general, both citizenship and power are required to achieve high compliance, where the former has a greater impact than the latter, even though this may be caused to some extent by our exploratory choice of meta-parameters, which are not calibrated to any specific situation.
